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Recent Decisions
Admiralty

-

Helmsman Of Tug

-

A Proper Lookout?

Anthony v. International Paper Company, 289 F. 2d 574
(4th Cir. 1961). Defendant's 70 foot tug was proceeding
at top speed along the Inland Waterway in South Carolina
waters at a point where and a time when small boats frequented the area. The captain was alone at the helm, the
rest of the crew being at dinner. He first observed the
small boat of the plaintiffs' decedents a little ahead of
him and approximately 250 feet off his port bow. As their
paths crossed the small boat capsized in the tug's wake,
drowning four persons. The decedents' administrators
brought this consolidated action under the South Carolina
Wrongful Death Statute. The principles of maritime law
were applied in the absence of any contrary indication
under the law of South Carolina. [See Hess v. United
States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide Corp.,
361 U.S. 340 (1960). See also 11 Md. L. Rev. 125 (1950)].
The jury found for the defendant. On appeal, the Circuit
Court of Appeals held that it was not error for the judge
to refuse to instruct the jury that "the master of a vessel
cannot, as a matter of law, act as both helmsman and
lookout," and that if the failure to have an independent
lookout was the proximate cause of the accident, then the
defendant was liable. The Court reasoned that the question of sufficiency of the lookout under Art. 29, Inland Rules,
33 U.S.C.A. (1957) § 221, requiring "a proper lookout" in
any instance is a question of fact to be realistically resolved
under the attendant circumstances. However, the case was
remanded for other prejudicial errors in the instructions
concerning lookouts.
Unlike the instant case, most opinions, make no express
exception to the rule requiring a crew member to act solely
as a lookout, regardless of the size of the vessel, if it is
capable of committing injury. The Marion, 56 F. 271 (N.D.
Wash. 1893). Nor can the captain or the helmsman in the
pilot house be considered lookouts within the meaning of
the maritime law. Dahlmer v. Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co., 26 F. 2d 603 (1st Cir. 1928). See cases cited
in 33 U.S.C.A. (1957) § 221, n. 54. See also The Ottawa, 70
U.S. (3 Wall.) 268 (1865), and cases cited in 10 AM. DIG.
(Cent. Ed.) 434, Collision, § 143, for early statements of the
rule. The PropellerGenesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443
(U.S. 1851), holds that failure to have a constant lookout
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besides the helmsman is prima facie evidence of fault.
However, in The Pocomoke, 150 F. 193 (E.D. Va. 1906),
where there was a deckhand forward and one aft, the court
said that the navigator on a 61 foot launch was a sufficient
lookout where he had visibility all around. See La Interamericana,S.A. v. The Narco, 146 F. Supp. 270, 273 (S.D.
Fla. 1956).
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Philadelphia,Wilmington and Baltimore R.R. Co. v. Kerr, qt al., 33 Md. 331
(1870), indicated that there is a duty to have a competent
lookout in addition to the helmsman. In U.S. v. Holland,
151 F. Supp. 772 (D.C. Md. 1957), involving a 408 foot
motor ship, the Court said that it is not safe to depend on
the pilot or others on the bridge who are charged with
other duties and that a crew member should be assigned
whose sole duty is to be a lookout.
GRIFFIN ON COLLISION (1949) § 109, p. 277, states that
"on vessels of any size, the rule is definite that the lookout
must have no other duty." However, GRmFN says at page
278 that the rule must be "reasonably applied." See also
48 Am. Jur. 179, Shipping, § 268, 15 C.J.S. 112, Collision,
§ 108b and for application of the rule as to lookouts on
motorboats, see 63 A.L.R. 2d 343 (1959).

Contracts - Mutual Mistake As To Extent Of Injuries
Avoids Release Of Claims. 'Reed v. Harvey, ...... Ia .......
110 N.W. 2d 442 (1961). Plaintiff instituted an action
against defendant dog owner to recover for injuries resulting from an attack by his dog. In attempting to avoid the
attack, the plaintiff wrenched her knee. Her doctor treated
her for cuts, but he felt that the injury to the knee was
only a sprain which would disappear in a short time, and
discharged her. She entered into a release with the defendant's insurance company for all "known and unknown,
forseen and unforseen" bodily and personal injuries resulting from the dog bite. The consideration paid by the insurance company for the release was $16.42 to the plaintiff
for her torn clothes and trouble and $19.00 to her doctor.
Five months later, due to the wrenching of the knee, it was
necessary to remove certain ligaments and a cystic area
from the left knee causing medical expense of $824.47 and
leaving the plaintiff with a 7% permanent partial disability. At the trial the defendant relied on the release as
one of its defenses. The Court submitted to the jury the
issue of whether there was here mutual mistake which
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went to the essence of the contract. They found for the
plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court
of Iowa in affirming the judgment held that a general release of claims for personal injury may be avoided if the
parties are acting under a mutual mistake as to the existence of an injury and this question was properly submitted
to the jury.
It is well settled that a mutual mistake as to a material
fact inducing the execution of a contract may be a ground
for relief from its enforcement. Sherwood v. Walker, 66
Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887). This principle has been
applied to a contract for the release of any and all claims
for personal injuries where there was a mutual mistake as
to the nature and extent of the releasing party's injuries.
Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E. 2d 953 (1941).
But see James v. Tarply, 209 Ga. 421, 73 S.E. 2d 188 (1952)
[held: a release would not be rescinded because the parties had bargained by contract as to future liability arising
from the accident and the plaintiff should have ascertained
the extent of his injuries before agreeing to a settlement].
In Yehle v. New York Cent. R. Co., 267 App. Div. 301, 46
N.Y.S. 2d 5 (1943) the Court upheld a release as valid
reasoning that where the consideration for the release was
in excess of the expenses for the known injuries, the parties had intended to compromise as to future injuries. In
England v. Universal FinanceCo., 186 Md. 432,47 A. 2d 389
(1946) defendant had sold to complainant a 1940 automobile which he asserted was a 1941 model. Complainant
accepted a refund in exchange for granting a release to
defendant of any past, present or future claims regarding
the car. It was later learned the car was stolen. In an
equity suit to rescind or reform the release because of a
mutual mistake, the defendant's demurrer was sustained
on the ground that the complainant had an adequate
remedy at law. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning
the complaint alleged mutual mistake and that the theory
of mutual mistake was not available to the complainant in
an action at law but was a proper basis to afford relief
in an equitable action for reformation of the release. See
also Dyson v. Pen Mar Co., Inc., 195 Md. 107, 73 A. 2d 4
(1950) [possibility of avoiding a personal injury release
entered into under a mutual mistake in equity] (dictum).
For a thorough discussion see Annotation, Personal Injury - Release - Avoidance, 71 A.L.R. 2d 82 (1960). See
also 76 C.J.S. 645, Release, § 25; 12 Am. Jur. 618, Contracts,
§ 125; 45 Am. Jur. 685, Release, § 20.
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Criminal Law - Insanity: M'Naghten-Durham Conflict,
A Recent Approach. U.S. v. Currens, 290 F. 2d 751 (3d
Cir. 1961). The defendant was indicted for violation of the
National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.A. (1951)
§ 2312. At the Court's direction, the defendant underwent
psychiatric examination which resulted in his being classified as having a basic sociopathic personality disturbance
with schizophrenic tendencies. The defendant then entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. A psychiatrist testified that although the defendant knew the difference between right and wrong, his mental condition invariably caused him to take the wrong path. After a
motion for directed verdict of acquittal had been denied,
the defendant submitted two jury instructions; one based
on the M'Naghten Rule and the other based on the Durham
Rule. The Court rejected the Durham instruction and gave
an instruction based on the M'Naghten Rule and an "irresistible impulse" test. The defendant excepted to the
Court's instruction. The jury returned a verdict of guilty,
and the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal or
in the alternative for a new trial, which was denied, and
the present appeal ensued. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in a 2-1 decision held that the instruction concerning criminal responsibility and insanity was prejudicial to the defendant in that it was confined to the outmoded M'Naghten Rule coupled with an equally insufficient "irresistible impulse" test, and remanded the case
for a new trial. The Court went on to lay down its formula
for determining insanity: "The jury must be satisfied that
at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated."
(p. 774). In presenting its new test for insanity, the court
expressed its view that the impractical and out-moded
principles surrounding the distinction between right and
wrong as set out in the M'Naghten Rule provided valid
grounds for support for a change, but that the Durham
Rule was not a sufficiently clear test by which a jury could
determine criminal responsibility. The majority of the
Court reasoned that its own test of insanity more readily
resolved the conflict between mental disorder and criminal
responsibility.
A test similar to the instant one has been proposed by
a Committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Manfred Guttmacher which was appointed in 1957 by the Legislative
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Council of Maryland. It reads in part: " . . . if, as a result
of mental disease or deficiency of intelligence at the time
of such conduct, he lacks sufficient capacity either to understand and appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. * * * "
Report of the Committee to Study The Laws For The Commitment of Mentally Ill Persons, December, 1958. This
proposal closely resembles the test of the American Law
Institute's MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). See also 5 VT.STAT.ANN.182, T.13 § 4801(1) (1958).
A majority of both the federal and state courts adopt the
"right-wrong" test of M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200,
8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Maryland is in accord with the
majority view. State v. Spencer, 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809
(1888). For a rejection of the "irresistible impulse" test
see State v. Spencer, supra. See also Thomas v. State, 206
Md. 575, 112 A. 2d 913 (1955) and Bryant v. Maryland, 207
Md. 565, 115 A. 2d 502 (1955). A minority adhere to the
"is the act a product of the mental defect" approach of
Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). For an
earlier case initiating this approach see State v. Pike, 49
N.H. 399 (1870); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871). For a
further discussion of the cases see 45 A.L.R. 2d 1447
(1956); 50 Georgetown L.J. 105 (1961); 19 Md. L. Rev. 271
(1959); 15 Md. L. Rev. 44, 93, 255 (1955); 41 Iowa L. Rev.
485 (1956); 22 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 367 (1955); WEIHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRimiNAL DEFENSE (1954) 71;
GuTTmAcHER

AND WEIHOFEN,

PSYCHIATRY AND T=E LAW

(1955).

Criminal Law - Murder Defendant's Right To Consult
Counsel At Pre-Indictment Questioning By State Officers.
People v. Noble, 9 N.Y. 2d 571, 175 N.E.2d 451 (1961). The
defendants, a woman and her paramour, were brought in
for questioning concerning the murder of the woman's
"common law husband." While being interrogated prior
to indictment, one defendant asked several times whether
he had to answer any questions before consulting legal
counsel. After the assistant district attorney repeatedly
ignored the defendant's questions, the defendant confessed
in writing. The jury found the defendant's confession to
be voluntary and convicted both defendants of first-degree
murder. The New York Court of Appeals in a 5-2 decision
reversed the convictions, reasoning that: (1) the use of
the confession "violated the fundamental fairness essential

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

to the concept of justice"; (2) there is a distinction "between a mere failure to warn and a flat refusal to answer
a proper inquiry" as to defendant's rights, and; (3) the
confession as thus procured was "an invasion of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination." Two of the
judges concurred in the result on the basis that the state
had not substantiated the voluntariness of the confession
beyond a reasonable doubt. The dissenters, on the other
hand, reasoned that since the state is under no duty to
advise a criminal defendant of his right to counsel prior
to indictment, People v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y. 147, 87 N.E.
112 (1909), mere failure to answer the defendant's inquiry,
absent any affirmative denial of his right to counsel, was
not a deprivation of due process.
The United States Supreme Court in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958) and CiCenia v. LaGay, 357 U.S.
504 (1958), by a 5-4 and 5-3 decisions respectively, held
that refusal by state officers of a murder defendant's request for counsel at pre-trial questioning did not of itself
vitiate a confession following the refusal, but reasoned
that such a refusal violates due process if defendant "is so
prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with
an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice'," 357 U.S. 433, 439. The 4-justice
minority of the Court in Crooker v. California stated that
the Due Process Clause requires that an accused have the
right to consult counsel at any time after the moment of
arrest, id., 448, (see Hamilton v. Alabama, 30 U.S. L. Week
1005, November 14, 1961, where the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed a conviction where defendant, convicted of a capital offense, had been denied counsel at
arraignment at which time it was required by state law
that certain defenses be raised.) The Maryland Court of
Appeals in Day v. State, 196 Md. 384, 397, 76 A. 2d 729
(1950) affirmed the defendant's murder convictions, stating, "The failure to have counsel present, or to permit the
accused to consult counsel, is not of itself a reason for
denying the admission of a confession, provided such confession is shown otherwise to have been given voluntarily." In accord, Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A. 2d 751
(1960); Andler v. Kriss, 197 Md. 362, 79 A. 2d 391 (1951);
Cox v. State, 192 Md. 525, 64 A. 2d 732 (1949). See also,
3 A.L.R. 2d 1003 (1949); Annotation, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1644
(1958); 7 M.L.E. 286, Criminal Law, § 243; 9 Kan. L. Rev.
464 (1961); 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 511 (1960); 10 Am. U. L. Rev.
53 (1961).
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Domestic Relations - Conduct Related To Mental
Deficiency Not Constructive Desertion. Stecher v. Stecher,
226 Md. 155, 172 A. 2d 515 (1961). A wife brought an
action for award of permanent alimony without divorce,
alleging desertion on the part of the husband. The husband answered the complaint, contending that he had
just cause in leaving the marital home due to the wife's
misconduct. 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, §§ 24, 25. Sometime after the birth of their two children the wife became
increasingly moody, neglected her children and household
chores and exhibited an antagonistic attitude toward her
husband. Her condition was analyzed by a psychiatrist as
paranoid schizophrenia. At the husband's direction she
was hospitalized, and in 1959, upon her removal, the hospital records noted her diagnosis as "improved" and her
prognosis as "poor." The husband left the marital home
immediately upon her release and never returned. The
lower court awarded permanent alimony to the wife, rejecting the husband's contention of constructive desertion.
The Court of Appeals, in upholding the lower court's determination, reasoned that the wife's conduct did not constitute constructive desertion since it was not such as to
put the husband in fear of his life or render it impossible
for him to continue marital cohabitation with health,
safety, and self respect, and further, that it was his duty
in the instant case to bear and forebear, and cherish in
sickness and in health.
Although there is some out-of-state authority to the
contrary, Schreiber v. Schreiber, 139 A. 2d 278 (D.C. Mun.
App. 1958), violent and outrageous conduct making life unbearable may constitute constructive desertion even when
it does not justify divorce a mensa on the ground of cruelty.
8 M.L.E. 376-379, Divorce, § 20. This may be true even
though the unbearable conduct is the result of mental illness. In Kruse v. Kruse, 179 Md. 657, 22 A. 2d 475 (1941),
a wife became mentally ill six years after marriage, and
a year after the birth of their child she was committed to
a hospital, her condition being diagnosed as paranoid with
depressive features. Her condition was not expected to
improve. The wife interfered with the husband at work,
made physical attacks on him, and publicly accused him
of having immoral relations with other women. The decree awarding the husband a limited divorce was sustained
by the Court of Appeals. The Court reasoned that the
wife's conduct was violent and outrageous and constituted
sufficient grounds for constructive desertion. The Court
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went on to state that conduct of one spouse which forces
the other to leave may justify a divorce to the other spouse
on the ground of constructive desertion, even though the
conduct may not justify a divorce on the ground of cruelty.
However, such conduct must render impossible the continuation of matrimonial cohabitation with safety, health,
and self-respect. See also Schwartzman v. Schwartzman,
204 Md. 125, 102 A. 2d 810 (1954). In the instant case, the
court distinguished the Kruse case on the ground that the
wife's conduct was not violent or outrageous. Cf. Ritz v.
Ritz, 188 Md. 336, 52 A. 2d 729 (1947).
For further reference see Smith v. Smith, 225 Md. 282,
170 A. 2d 195 (1961); Pohzehl v. Pohzehl, 205 Md. 395, 109
A. 2d 58 (1954); Myerberg, Constructive Desertion in
Maryland, 10 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1949); 27A C.J.S. 107 ff.,
Divorce, § 36(3); 19 A.L.R. 2d 144; 19 A.L.R. 2d 1428 (1951).

Homicide - Defendant's Unlawful Or Reckless Conduct Must Be Direct Cause Of Death To Constitute Involuntary Manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa.
571, 170 A. 2d 310 (1961) (for prior Law Review treatment of the case in the intermediate appellate court see
20 Md. L. Rev. 299). The defendant and deceased were
engaged in an auto race at speeds between 70 and 90 miles
per hour in a 50 mile zone. While attempting to pass the
defendant on the left of a two lane highway, the deceased
collided with a truck coming from the opposite direction,
and died as a result of the collision. Defendant was tried
and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. When his motion in arrest of judgment was denied, he appealed to the
Superior Court which affirmed his conviction. On further
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in a 6-1 decision, reversed and held that in order for one to be guilty
of involuntary homicide his conduct must be unlawful or
reckless and in addition such conduct must be the " .
direct cause of the death in issue." The court reasoned
that, "When proximate cause was first borrowed from the
field of tort law and applied to homicide prosecution in
Pennsylvania, it connoted a much more direct causal relation in producing the alleged culpable result than it does
today." (p. 311), and that the present day concept of proximate cause has no applicability to homicide. See 3 MD.
CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 388 (manslaughter by automobile
statute). Cf. Palmer v. State, 223 Md. 341, 352, 164 A. 2d
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715 (1960); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 598, 155 A. 2d 684
(1959) (where Maryland Court of Appeals appears to give
cause a broad meaning in manslaughter cases), noted 21
Md. L. Rev. 262 (1961).
Interrogatories - Defendant Required To Answer
Interrogatories Respecting Existence And Amount Of
Liability Insurance. Johanek v. Aberle, 27 F.R.D. 272 (D.C.
Mont. 1961). Plaintiff brought an action for damages for
personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident in
which plaintiff was riding as a gratuitous passenger in an
automobile driven by the defendant. Plaintiff submitted
interrogatories pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33, 28 U.S.C.A.
(1958) seeking to ascertain whether the defendant was
covered by a policy of liability insurance at the time of
the accident; and if so, the monetary limits of liability
thereunder. Defendant objected to the interrogatories
upon the ground that the information sought was immaterial and irrelevant. The court overruled the defendant's
objection reasoning that the test is not whether the information sought would be admissible in evidence or relevant to the precise issues in the case, but whether it is
"relevant to the subject matter" involved in the action.
In the instant case the court found "subject matter" to
include the right of the plaintiff to be apprised fully of the
merits of the suit and the true defendant in interest.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 28 U.S.C.A. (1958).
The conflict which exists in many of the federal and
state courts on the issue presented in the instant case is
only partially explained by varying statutes and rules. The
courts, as represented by the one above, that permit pretrial discoverey of insurance coverage and the amount
thereof do so on the grounds that injured plaintiffs are
thereby apprised of knowledge otherwise unobtainable,
which allows for a more realistic appraisal of the defendant and of the ultimate merits of the case, and affords a
more objective basis for the settlement of disputes. People
v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E. 2d 588 (1957); Brackett
v. Woodall Food Products, 12 F.R.D. 4 (D.C. Tenn. 1951).
Those denying such discovery reason that the purpose of
discovery is to permit all the facts relevant to the trial to
be disclosed in advance thereof, and that insurance coverage has no bearing on the presentation of the plaintiff's
case. Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958);
Verrastro v. Grecco, 21 Conn. Supp. 165, 149 A. 2d 703
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(1958). In State, Use of Gamber v. Hospital for Women of
Maryland, Inc., Superior Court of Baltimore City, Daily
Record, November 5, 1960, an action for negligence was instituted against a charitable corporation. The plaintiff
made a motion that the Court order the defendant to produce its insurance policy under Rule 419, Maryland Rules
of Procedure. In sustaining the motion in part, Chief Judge
Niles reasoned that since a charitable corporation is only
liable for its torts to the extent of its insurance coverage,
the plaintiff was entitled to ascertain the provisions of the
policy; however, he was not entitled to know the amount
of insurance even though this might aid him in settling
his claim. (Note that this is contrary to statements in the
two prior decisions referred to in NnFs, DIscovERY DIGEST
FOR MARYLAND, 1960, p. 12, under Charitable Corporation).
See Md. Rules (1961) 410, 417(e). For further discussion and cases, see: Fournier, Pre-TrialDiscovery of Insurance Coverage and Limits, 28 Ford. L. Rev. 215 (1959); 41
A.L.R. 2d 968 (1955).
Negligence - Owner Liable For Allowing Building To
Become A Fire Hazard Regardless Of Actual Cause Of Fire.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co. v. Poarch,
292 F. 2d 449 (9th Cir. 1961). Plaintiff sought to recover
damages for the alleged negligent destruction of his grain
elevator which was destroyed by a fire of unknown cause
which spread 50 feet from the defendant's adjacent ice
house. The fire had broken out in an unused portion of
the ice house which was accessable to itinerants and children, and destroyed both of the buildings in question along
with their contents. There was evidence that the ice house
was a fire hazard due to the accummulation of inflammable
materials within it. The trial court instructed the jury that
it was not necessary for them to determine the exact cause
of the fire in order to hold the defendant liable but rather
whether the state of disrepair of the defendant's building
caused the fire to spread. The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The Circuit
Court of Appeals, applying the law of Washington, affirmed
the judgment reasoning that if " . . . the owner of a building has negligently allowed it to become a fire hazard and
a fire does start the actual cause - whether deliberate,
accidental, or an act of God - is immaterial. The negligence is not in the ignition of the fire but rather it is in
allowing a condition to exist which will be reasonably
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likely to cause the injury to another if a fire does start."
(451). See Prince v. Chehalis Savings & Loan Ass'n, 186
Wash. 372, 58 P. 2d 290 (1936).
Some cases have reasoned that even though the facts
permit the inference that the defendant allowed a fire
hazard to exist on his property, he would not be liable for
the spread of fire unless he is shown to have been guilty of
some negligence in its origin or escape, although it should
be noted that in some of these cases the fire was known
(or believed) to have originated from a cause other than
the fire hazard; O'Brien Bros. v. New York, 36 F. 2d 102
(E.D. N.Y. 1928); Moody v. Gulf Refining Co., 142 Tenn.
280, 218 S.W. 817 (1920); Stone v. Boston & A. R. Co., 171
Mass. 536, 51 N.E. 1 (1898). The instant case supports the
view that the defendant is liable if he permits a fire hazard
to exist on his premises and it is reasonably probable that
if a fire started it would spread to the adjacent property
regardless of the cause of the fire, although, in many of
the cases supporting this view (as in the instant case)
the exact cause of the fire was not shown. Arneil v.
Schnitzer, 173 Ore. 179, 144 P. 2d 707 (1944); Menth v.
Breeze Corporation,Inc., 4 N.J. 428, 73 A. 2d 183, 18 A.L.R.
2d 1071 (1950); Texas & N. 0. R. Co. v. Bellar, 51 Tex.
Civ. App. 154, 112 S.W. 323 (1908). For further information see 18 A.L.R. 2d 1081 (1951). PROSSER ON TORTS (2d
ed. 1955) § 58, p. 326; 65 C.J.S. 563, Negligence, § 72; 38
Am. Jur. 728, Negligence, §§ 71 and 72; 37 Am. Jur. 942,
Mun. Corp., § 297; 22 Am. Jur. 602, Fires, §§ 11, 12. See also
42 A.L.R. 783 (1926) and 111 A.L.R. 1140 (1937).

Res Judicata - Wrongful Death Suit Bars Beneficiary's
Later Suit. Brinkman v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.,
111 Ohio App. 317, 172 N.E. 2d 154 (1960). Plaintiff and
her mother were passengers in an automobile which was
struck by defendant's train. The mother was killed. The
mother's administrator brought suit under the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute on behalf of plaintiff and other designated
beneficiaries, but failed to recover as defendant was found
not to have been negligent. Plaintiff later brought a separate suit for her personal injuries resulting from the
accident and defendant pleaded res judicata. Plaintiff contended that res judicata was not applicable because there
was not such an identity of parties in the two suits that
would bring into operation the principle of res judicata to
bar recovery. The Court of Appeals of Ohio held for de-
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fendant, stating that plaintiff, in addition to the other
beneficiaries, was the real party in interest in the wrongful
death action, thereby creating an identity of parties in both
suits sufficient to preclude recovery.
The weight of authority is that a matter is not res
judicata if there is no identity of persons and parties in the
respective actions. Garrison v. Bonham, 207 Okla. 599,
251 P. 2d 790 (1952); Keith v. Willers Truck Service, 64
S.D. 274, 266 N.W. 256 (1936). In Gleaton v. Southern Ry.
Co., 212 S.C. 186, 46 S.E. 2d 879 (1948), a case dealing with
a prior survival action as distinguished from a prior action
for wrongful death, plaintiff sued defendant railroad for
damages to her car resulting from a collision at a train
crossing, in which plaintiff's husband was killed. The court,
in granting plaintiff a right to bring suit, said that she was
not barred from re-litigating the issue of defendant's negligence, although in a prior action under the survival statute
brought by the executor of decedent's estate, defendant
was found not negligent. The court reasoned that plaintiff
was not a real party in interest to the survival action, in as
much as the proceeds of any recovery in such a suit would
go, under the applicable law, to the estate of decedent to
pay claims and other expenses, with only the surplus, if
any, distributed to the legatees, including plaintiff.
The Maryland Wrongful Death Statute, 6 MD. CODE
(1957), Art. 67, § 4 states: "Every such action shall be for
the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the
person whose death shall have been so caused ...
." Res
judicata in Maryland applies where there is identity of
parties or their privies, the latter including all those who
have a direct interest in the subject matter of the suit.
Ugast v. La Fontaine, 189 Md. 227, 55 A. 2d 705 (1947).
See also State, Use of Boshe v. Boyce, 72 Md. 140, 19 A.
366 (1890); Deford v. The State, Use of Keyser, et al., 30
Md. 179 (1869). Cases are collected in 125 A.L.R. 908
(1940). See RESTATEmET, JUDGMENTs (1942) § 85, 402.

Torts - Insurance Broker Liable For Failure To Advise
Adequate Coverage. Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp. 879
(W.D. Wash. 1961). The defendant, an insurance broker,
had procured for the plaintiff the entire insurance coverage for his business. Plaintiff's comprehensive liability
insurance excluded damage by fire to property held by
the insured as lessee. The plaintiff entered into a lease
with advice of counsel which did not have a provision
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exempting him from liability to the lessor in case of fire.
He notified the defendant of the existence of the lease but
did not furnish him a copy, nor did he inquire about necessary insurance. The defendant, however, neither requested
a copy of the lease nor sought to ascertain its terms. Subsequently, a fire destroyed the warehouse and the plaintiff
was required to pay the lessor's insurer the sum of
$41,954.24 for damage to the building. Plaintiff brought
this action in tort against the defendant for breach of duty.
At trial, plaintiff's witness, an insurance expert, testified
that a lease was a "red light" to an expert insurance advisor, which would necessitate an examination to determine possible liability, and the extent of insurance coverage necessary. Applying the law of Washington, the District Court allowed recovery, reasoning that an insurance
broker who holds himself out to be a skilled insurance
advisor has a duty to those customers he advises and for
whom he secures their entire insurance coverage, to examine any leases entered into by such customers and to
advise them concerning potential liability thereunder.
Failure to do so will render him liable in tort.
Generally an agent or broker who agrees to secure
adequate insurance on specific propertly is liable if he
fails to procure an effective and adequate policy. Hampton
Road Carriers v. Boston Insurance Co., 150 F. Supp. 338
(D.C. Md. 1957); Case v. Ewbanks, Ewbanks & Co., 194
N.C. 775, 140 S.E. 709 (1927). Cf. Heaphy v. Kimball, 293
Mass. 414, 200 N.E. 551 (1936). In Fries-Breslin Co. v.
Bergen, 176 F. 76 (3d Cir. 1909), cert. den. 215 U.S. 609, the
defendant, who had undertaken to secure insurance on insured's business property, and had been notified by insured of a mortgage on the property was held to be under
no duty to advise plaintiff that the policy didn't cover
mortgaged personalty. For further information see 3 C.J.S.
38, Agency, §§ 160, 161e; 12 M.L.E. 371, Insurance, § 21;
Annotation, 29 A.L.R. 2d 171 (1953); 17 Dec. Dig. (6th Dec.)
154, Insurance, Key No. 103; PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955)
§ 31, p. 132.

Torts - No Recovery Allowed Under Federal Tort
Claims Act For Injury Arising In Course Of Military Service Even Though Negligence Occurred During Pre-Induction. Healy v. U.S., 192 F. Supp. 325 (S.D. N.Y. 1961).
Plaintiff, while a civilian, was given a pre-induction physical by an Air Force doctor who concluded that he was
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physically capable. The plaintiff was, in fact, afflicted by
a heart condition that was not discovered due to the doctor's alleged negligence. While the plaintiff was undergoing basic training in the Air Force the heart condition
was aggravated and he was hospitalized and, thereafter,
discharged from the service. In the present suit for recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the District
Court sustained the government's motion to dismiss, reasoning: (1) that even if there were negligence at the preinduction physical when the plaintiff was a civilian, it is
the injury itself which makes the claim compensable; and
(2) that, since the injury occurred during basic training
while the plaintiff was in the military service, the doctrine
of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) precluded recovery. In the Feres case, in denying recovery for injuries
received by military personnel while in military service,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the Federal Tort Claims
Act did not apply since there existed a system of adequate
compensation by way of pensions, medical services, etc.,
under the Veteran's Administration; that Congress in passing the Act had shown no intent to give military personnel
a right of action under it; and that the government-soldier
relationship precluded recovery. However, in United States
v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954) in allowing recovery, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the respondent, an honorably discharged veteran, was a civilian and not in the military service when the injury occurred in an operation at a
Veteran's hospital after his discharge.
The Court's holding, that a compensable action generally arises as of the date of the injury and not from the
date that the alleged negligence occurred, is in accord with
the majority view. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp.
Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824, 104 A.L.R. 450 (1936);
Murphy v. Indovina, 384 Pa. 26, 119 A. 2d 258 (1956). Cf.
Hahn v. Claybrook, 130 Md. 179, 100 A. 83 (1917). For
further information as to when a cause of action arises see,
38 Am. Jur. 673, Negligence, § 28; 65 C.J.S. 854, Negligence,
§ 175; 144 A.L.R. 209 (1943); 74 A.L.R. 1317 (1931). For
information concerning the right of a serviceman to sue for
injuries occurring in military service see, 40 Ky. L.J. 438
(1952); 40 Va. L. Rev. 634 (1954).

